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Abstract
Foreign bank entry is frequently associated with spillover e¤ects for local banks
and increasing competition in the local banking market. We study the impact of
these e¤ects on host countries. In particular, we ask how these e¤ects interact
and how they depend on the competitive environment of the host banking market.
An increasing number of banks is more likely to have positive welfare e¤ects the
more competitive the market environment, whereas spillovers are less likely to
have positive welfare e¤ects the stronger competition. Hence, competitive e¤ects
seem to reinforce each other, while spillovers and competition tend to weaken each
other.
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1 Introduction
One of the most striking developments in the banking sector in transition and
emerging market economies has been the sharp increase of foreign bank entry
during the last decade. For instance, the market share of foreign banks in Eastern
Europe has gone up from on average around 11 per cent in 1995 to around 65
per cent in 2003 (Claeys and Hainz, 2006). The situation looks similar in Latin
America, and foreign bank entry is likewise on the rise in other emerging economies
in Asia, Africa and the Middle East, albeit at a lower pace (Clarke et al, 2003).
Why do transition and emerging economies open up their banking markets
and what are the consequences? Governments liberalize their banking markets
in order to attract new capital and to promote the restructuring of their often
rather ine¢ cient banking systems. One possible channel for how foreign banks
may foster such a restructuring process is spillover e¤ects from foreign to domestic
banks, another possible channel could be the increase in competition. However,
the opening up of banking markets can also entail large risks since domestic banks
need to undertake huge investments to become competitive to foreign banks.
The aim of our paper is to analyze the impact of foreign bank entry on host
countries, emphasizing the transition and emerging market context. We study in
particular the two channels through which foreign banks may have an inuence on
the domestic banking market, spillovers and an increase in competition. We ana-
lyze how they a¤ect the domestic banksincentives to improve on their e¢ ciency
and host countriessocial welfare. We ask in particular how the two channels inter-
act, i.e. whether or not they reinforce each other. We also investigate how di¤erent
modes of foreign bank entry di¤er in their impact on the domestic banking market.
For this purpose, we set up a model of spatial bank competition à la Salop.
Banks compete in prices for potential borrowers that engage in investment projects
of uncertain return. Banks in our model di¤er with respect to screening abilities.
Foreign banks have perfect screening ability while, for simplicity, domestic banks
in the closed economy are assumed not to have access to a screening technology.
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When the domestic banking market opens up, foreign banks are given the possi-
bility to enter the market, either via the acquisition of a domestic bank or through
a greeneld investment. Due to spillover e¤ects from foreign to domestic banks,
domestic banks gain access to a screening technology, albeit not as sophisticated
as that of foreign banks. Domestic banks then have the choice to undertake an
investment in order to obtain the perfect screening technology.
Our rst focus is on the implications of spillover e¤ects on the e¢ ciency of
liberalizing banking markets. We nd that with rising spillovers the incentives
of domestic banks to invest in the perfect screening technology fall because the
higher the spillover e¤ects, the less a bank gains by investing in screening. Thus,
we identify a trade-o¤ between two regimes. High spillover e¤ects result in a
market in which just a few banks dispose of perfect screening ability while a large
number of domestic banks know to screen fairly well. In contrast, low spillovers
imply a situation in which a lot of domestic banks invest in the perfect screening
technology but some domestic banks screen only very imperfectly.
A second major issue we study is the role of competition in terms of the number
of banks operating in the market. Since the number of banks in the economy
increases in case of de novo investments but stays constant with acquisition entry,
greeneld entry corresponds to a higher competitiveness in the market. Hence,
analyzing the e¤ect of competition allows us to draw some conclusions concerning
the di¤erent implications of acquisition and de novo entry for liberalizing banking
markets.
We nd that a larger number of banks operating in the market leads to declining
repayment rates as well as to smaller market shares and, thus, tends to decrease the
incentives of domestic banks to invest in screening. We conclude that investment
incentives for domestic banks are higher in case of acquisition than in case of
greeneld entry.
A major focus of our analysis constitutes the interaction of spillovers and com-
petition. We nd that spillovers and competition reinforce each other in their
negative impact on the number of domestic banks investing in screening. Thus,
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the di¤erent implications of acquisition and greeneld entry widen when spillovers
rise.
We study further how the impact of spillovers and competition in the number of
banks depends on the competitiveness of a market in terms of the degree of product
di¤erentiation. Our analysis shows that with lower product di¤erentiation and thus
higher competitiveness, the negative impact of spillovers and competition on the
investment incentives of domestic banks is dampened. Hence, the more competitive
a market, the less the entry mode matters for the incentives of domestic banks to
invest in screening.
From a social welfare point of view, the impact of spillovers and competition
in the number of banks and, thus, the entry mode on welfare is ambiguous and
depends on the degree of product di¤erentiation. When product di¤erentiation is
high, welfare increases with spillovers and decreases with the number of banks op-
erating in the market. In contrast, with low product di¤erentiation lower spillovers
as well as higher competition and, thus, greeneld entry, is to be preferred.
Our major conclusions from the welfare analysis are thus as follows: both modes
of competition, a larger number of banks and lower product di¤erentiation, work
as a form of complements. In particular, a larger number of banks operating in the
market and thus greeneld entry can, in general, only be welfare enhancing when
competitive pressure in terms of lower product di¤erentiation is also su¢ ciently
large. Hence, one channel of competition is not su¢ cient in order to raise welfare,
rather, a high level of both competition e¤ects is necessary for enhancing welfare.
In contrast, we nd that spillovers constitute a form of substitute relative to either
channel of competition, i.e. potential positive welfare e¤ects of spillovers are lower
the stronger is competition.
Foreign bank entry has received surprisingly little attention in the literature
so far. Goldberg (2004) raises the issue by comparing foreign direct investments
in the nancial and the manufacturing sector, focusing on the implications for
emerging market economies. Attempts to analyze foreign bank entry in a theo-
retical framework have been scarce. DellAriccia, Friedman and Marquez (1999)
3
point to the problem potential entrant banks may face in distinguishing good from
bad borrowers that have already been rejected by incumbent banks. In line with
this approach, DellAriccia and Marquez (2004) analyze the trade-o¤ between su-
perior information of host country banks and lower renancing costs of foreign
banks entering the market. Buch (2003) sets up a theoretical model of foreign
bank entry and nds empirical support for the hypothesis that large information
barriers discourage entry of foreign banks. Hauswald and Marquez (2003) con-
sider the possibility of information spillovers from incumbent host country banks
to potential entrants and show that, as a result, interest rates and bank prots
decrease. Kaas (2004) presents a model of spatial loan competition and arrives
at the conclusion that foreign bank entry is generally too low compared to the
social optimum. Claeys and Hainz (2006) as well as Van Tassel and Vishwasrao
(2005) look at how di¤erent entry modes of foreign banks a¤ect competition in a
liberalized banking market. Both approaches imply that greeneld entry leads to
more competition and thus lower interest rates in the host banking market.
We contribute to this strand of literature by introducing spillover e¤ects into
a model of spatial bank competition. In this respect, our paper corresponds to
theoretical approaches analyzing the e¤ect of spillovers on R&D investment and
cost reduction. Negative e¤ects of spillovers on R&D incentives and cost reduction
e¤ort are stated by Spence (1984). In contrast, Cohen and Levinthal (1989) as
well as Levin and Reiss (1988) both nd theoretical and empirical support for the
hypothesis that intra-industry spillovers may lead to an increase in R&D invest-
ment.
Görg and Strobl (2001) nd that empirical evidence on spillovers is mixed and
point to the role of the underlying econometric framework. Coe and Helpman
(1995) and Coe, Helpman and Ho¤maister (1997) suggest that foreign R&D via
international trade entails spillovers in the sense that total factor productivity
rises both in developed and in developing countries. Similarly, Beck, Levine and
Loayza (2000) conclude that nancial intermediary development raises total factor
productivity growth. Blomström and Kokko (1998) also support this view. In their
survey of literature on spillovers from multinational corporations to host country
rms they nd evidence that the e¤ect of spillovers is positive and increases with
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the degree of competition in the host country. Ceccagnoli (2005) indicates that
spillovers increase R&D e¤ort when the number of innovating rms is small.
In addition to the impact of spillovers, we study the e¤ect of competition on
the incentives of host country banks to invest in better screening skills. Our model
relates to a strand of theoretical literature on the inuence of competition on in-
novation incentives. Vives (2004) shows that an increasing number of rms in
the market implies lower R&D investment while rising competition in terms of
increasing product substitutability encourages R&D incentives. Raith (2003) in-
vestigates the e¤ect of mounting competition on cost reducing e¤ort in a principal
agent setting and concludes that both an increasing number of rms in the market
and rising product substitutability increase the incentives to invest in cost reduc-
tion. In contrast, Boot and Marinµc (2006) nd that ercer competition in terms
of an increasing number of banks operating in the market reduces bankse¤orts
to invest in better monitoring technologies. Schnitzer (1999) studies the impact
of competition on the e¢ ciency of credit allocation. She nds that screening in-
centives rise with the number of informed banks and that increasing competition
raises the likelihood of bad loans. Hauswald and Marquez (2005) present a model
of spatial bank competition in which banks can invest in strategic information
acquisition about the quality of borrowersinvestment projects and nd that ris-
ing competition decreases investment in screening. Similarly, Broecker (1990) and
Sharpe (1990) show that increasing competition decreases the quality of a banks
loan portfolio.
Empirical papers investigating increasing competition in the light of foreign
bank entry are numerous. Claessens, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2001) suggest
that higher competitive pressure due to foreign bank entry implies an increase in
the e¢ ciency of host country banks and thus higher welfare in economies liber-
alizing their banking markets. Fries and Taci (2005) study the cost e¢ ciency of
banks in Eastern European Countries and nd that costs of all banks are lower
when the presence of foreign banks in a country is high. Martinez Peria and Mody
(2004) distinguish between acquisition and greeneld entry in the context of Latin
America. They nd that the interest rate spread of foreign banks entering via a de
novo investment is lower than that of banks entering via the acquisition of a host
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country bank. Moreover, their analysis suggests that a higher presence of foreign
banks leads to lower costs of all banks operating in the market.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes
the set-up of the model. In section 3 we study the equilibrium in the banking mar-
ket. Section 4 analyzes the comparative statics of spillover e¤ects and competitive
pressure on the e¢ ciency of the domestic banking market. We present the welfare
analysis in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
Consider a continuum of borrowers with massm being uniformly distributed along
a circular road with circumference 1. Each borrower can engage in one investment
project that requires an initial outlay of i; i > 0. Borrowers have either good or
bad projects. It is common knowledge that the fraction of borrowers with good
projects is  and the fraction of borrowers with bad projects is 1  ; 0 <  < 1.
In case the project is good it generates a return v > 0 with certainty while a
bad project always fails yielding a return of zero. The returns of the projects
are observable and contractible. We assume that ex ante borrowers do not know
the quality of their projects. Hence, we think of borrowers as not being capable
to evaluate correctly the outcome of their investment projects because of lacking
expertise in project evaluation.4 Borrowers are not endowed with any initial wealth
and therefore need to apply for credit at the banks, the only source of nance in
our model.
The banking sector consists of n banks that are located equidistantly along
the circular road.5 The location of a bank signies its specialization in a certain
credit product or industry. Banks compete in the repayments rj; j = 1; :::; n they
simultaneously ask from the borrowers. Borrowers whose investment projects yield
a return of v must repay rj to the bank whereas borrowers whose projects fail do
4Similar assumptions can be found e.g. in Hauswald and Marquez (2005) or Kaas (2004).
5For our analysis to be interesting we assume that there is a su¢ ciently large number of
domestic banks that can be a¤ected by foreign bank entry, i.e. ln is not close to 1.
6
not repay their loan. We assume that banks in the closed domestic banking market
do not have access to a screening technology so that all borrowers are o¤ered a
credit of size i because by assumption, rj > i.6 We take it as given that each bank
disposes of enough funds to nance all borrowers applying for a credit. Borrowers
base their decision at which bank to apply for credit on the repayments rj asked
by the banks and the transport costs they have to incur to travel to the bank.
The transport costs express the preferences borrowers have for a particular type
of bank. We assume that transport costs tx are proportional to the distance x
between the borrower and the bank. Furthermore, we assume that the return of a
good project v is high enough so that the market is covered at equilibrium prices.
Borrowers and banks are risk neutral and maximize prots. The time structure of
the model is as follows.
At stage 1, the domestic banking market is opened up to a number l of foreign
banks.7 We distinguish between two entry modes. Foreign banks can enter either
via a greeneld investment or via the acquisition of a domestic bank. When banks
enter via a de novo investment a foreign subsidiary is established in the domestic
banking market and so the number of banks operating in the market increases.
In contrast, entry via acquisition leaves the number of banks constant since we
consider an acquired domestic bank as a foreign bank. As a matter of simplicity,
we assume that there are no costs of entry. Banks locate equidistantly along the
circular road. We assume that foreign banks dispose of perfect screening ability.
Consequently, foreign banks nance all borrowers with good projects that ask for
a credit whereas a borrower with a bad project is never o¤ered a credit. Without
loss of generality, we assume that screening a borrower is costless for a foreign
bank.
We assume that with foreign banks entering the domestic banking market
spillover e¤ects occur. For instance, spillovers could realize via an improvement in
the human capital stock when domestic sta¤ is employed and trained by foreign
banks. With some uctuations of workers, better risk management techniques,
6Think for instance of the transition countries where due to the planning of the economy no
screening took place during the communist era.
7For our analysis to be interesting we assume that there is a su¢ ciently large number of
domestic banks that can be a¤ected by foreign bank entry, i.e. ln is not close to 1.
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superior forms of organization, better data processing technologies etc. can then
be implemented in domestic banks alike. Spillovers could also realize via the repli-
cation of high quality nancial services o¤ered by foreign banks. Furthermore,
foreign banks are likely to press for an improved regulatory supervision of the
banking markets they enter. Spillover e¤ects are modeled as follows. We assume
that with the entry of foreign banks domestic banks obtain access to an imperfect
screening technology. Domestic banks can therefore identify the fraction 1   ;
0 <  < 1; of borrowers investing in bad projects but cannot distinguish between
the remaining fraction  of borrowers with bad projects and the borrowers with
good projects. Accordingly, domestic banks nance the fraction  of borrowers
investing in bad projects as well as all borrowers with good projects applying for
credit. However, the fraction 1  of borrowers with bad projects is denied credit.
Hence, the higher is the spillover e¤ect, the better is the quality of the screening
technology the domestic banks obtain and the lower is the fraction  of borrowers
with bad projects nanced in the banking market opened to foreign banks. With-
out loss of generality, we assume that there are no per borrower screening costs
for all banks.
At stage 2, domestic banks have the possibility to invest a xed cost F > 0 in
order to obtain the perfect screening technology. This decision is taken simultane-
ously by all domestic banks. Hence, domestic banks need to weigh the size of the
xed cost against the costs associated with the nancing of borrowers with bad
projects in case they do not invest in the perfect screening technology. As a result,
the situation in the open domestic banking market looks as follows. Three types
of banks can operate in this market: foreign banks, domestic banks that dispose of
the perfect screening technology, and domestic banks that only screen imperfectly.
At stage 3, borrowers apply for credit at the banks. Banks engage in screening
the borrowers. Banks that have access to the perfect screening technology make
credit o¤ers only to borrowers with good projects whereas banks not having in-
vested in screening o¤er a credit to borrowers investing in good projects and the
fraction  of borrowers with bad projects. Borrowers with bad projects that are
denied credit do not apply for credit at another bank. This is due to the fact that
with the screening procedure the borrowers learn about the bad quality of their
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investment opportunities and so give up on realizing their projects.8
At stage 4, returns realize and all borrowers investing in good projects pay
back their loan. We solve the game by backward induction.
3 Equilibrium in the Banking Market
In this section, we study the equilibrium of the domestic banking market with
foreign bank entry. We rst calculate the equilibrium repayments di¤erent types
of banks ask from the borrowers for a given number k of domestic banks that
invest in perfect screening. Then, we derive the equilibrium number of domestic
banks k that invest in the perfect screening technology. We assume that all banks
are randomly allocated along the circle, so each location is equally likely for each
bank. Thus, we can dene the probability that the neighboring bank of a perfectly
screening bank also has access to the perfect screening technology as q := l+k 1
n 1 .
Proposition 1 In equilibrium, banks with perfect screening technology charge a
repayment rL, whereas banks with imperfect screening technology charge a repay-
ment rH > rL, where
rL = i+
t
n
+
i (1  )

1  q
2
(1)
rH = i+
t
n
+
i (1  )


1  q
2

: (2)
Proof: see Appendix.
The equilibrium prices described in Proposition 1 result in the following equi-
librium prots of foreign banks, FB, of domestic banks that invest in the perfect
screening technology, DB;L, and of domestic banks that do not invest in screening,
DB;H :
8The idea is that borrowers do not realize any utility from investing in a bad project.
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FB =
m
t
[
1
2
(1  q) i (1  )

+
t
n
]2 (3)
DB;L =
m
t
[
1
2
(1  q) i (1  )

+
t
n
]2   F (4)
DB;H =
m
t
[ q
2
i (1  )

+
t
n
]2. (5)
Note that the prots of all banks depend negatively on the share of perfectly
screening banks in the market. The intuition behind this is that rst, the more
banks operate in the market that screen perfectly the lower will be the expected
market share for any individual bank in the market because the likelihood that
it needs to share its market with a perfectly screening bank increases. Second, a
higher fraction of perfectly screening banks in the market leads to lower repayments
both types of banks can ask from the borrowers in equilibrium; this, in turn,
decreases prots for all banks. However, the prots of banks that have access to
the perfect screening technology fall by more than those of imperfectly screening
banks. On the one hand, this is due to the fact that the reduction in the size
of the repayment is weighed by a larger expected market share these banks cover
compared to the banks screening imperfectly. On the other hand, the more banks
operate in the market that screen perfectly the lower are the costs arising from
borrowers with bad projects if a bank does not invest in the screening technology.
This is due to the fall of the expected market share and hence the smaller number
of borrowers with bad projects asking for a loan.
Next, we derive the equilibrium number k of domestic banks that invest in the
perfect screening technology. When deciding about whether to invest in screening
or not, a domestic bank weighs the required xed cost against the costs associated
with the nancing of borrowers with bad projects if it does not invest in screening.
Proposition 2 characterizes the three di¤erent kinds of equilibria we get for low,
medium and high xed costs for the perfect screening technology.
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Proposition 2 There exist values of xed costs F and F , with F < F , such that
(1) for low values of the xed cost F  F; all domestic banks invest in the perfect
screening technology;
(2) for high values of the xed cost F  F ; no domestic bank invests in the perfect
screening technology;
(3) for intermediate values of the xed cost in the range F < F < F a number
k; 1  k  n   l; of domestic banks invests in the perfect screening technology.
The number k is the integer number that lies between
k =
n
2
  l   2t (n  1)
i (1  ) [
F
mi (1  )
(n  1)
(n  2)  
1
n
]
and
k = k + 1:
Proof: see Appendix.
The decision of a domestic bank to invest in screening or not clearly depends
on what all other domestic banks do. The higher the number of domestic banks
that invest in screening the less attractive it becomes for a bank to spend the
xed cost. This is due to the fact that with a rising fraction of perfectly screening
banks in the market the prot of a bank that has access to the perfect screening
technology decreases by more than the prot of a bank screening imperfectly as
explained above. If the xed cost is very low, however, the investment incentives
are so large that it pays for a domestic bank to invest in the screening technology
even if all other domestic banks also invest in screening. Instead, if the xed cost
is very large then it does not pay for a domestic bank to spend the xed cost even
if all other domestic banks do not invest in the screening technology, neither. For
intermediate ranges of the xed cost these two extreme equilibrium outcomes are
not feasible.
We can show that for intermediate values of the xed cost an equilibrium ex-
ists in which exactly k domestic banks invest in the screening technology whereas
the remainder of domestic banks does not invest in screening. Such an equi-
librium is stable if DB;L (k = k)  DB;H (k = k   1) and DB;H (k = k) 
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DB;L (k = k
 + 1). The value k that satises these two conditions is described in
Proposition 2. Note that in equilibrium, banks are not indi¤erent between invest-
ing and not investing in screening since the prot of banks that screen perfectly
lies slightly above the prot of banks screening imperfectly. Given k, however, no
domestic bank has an incentive to deviate because that would imply even lower
prots.
4 Impact of Spillovers and Competition on the
E¢ ciency of the Domestic Banking Market
In this section we study how spillovers as well as competition a¤ect the equilibrium
number of domestic banks investing in screening, k. In particular, we concentrate
on the interaction of spillovers and competition in terms of the number of banks
operating in the market. Moreover, we analyze how the strength of these e¤ects
depends on the competitiveness prevailing in the market as measured by the de-
gree of product di¤erentiation, 1
t
. We focus rst on the case of intermediate xed
costs of screening in which k domestic banks invest in the perfect screening tech-
nology. Then, we characterize how the parameter range of xed costs for which k
constitutes an equilibrium changes with spillover and competition e¤ects.
The following Proposition characterizes how k is inuenced by spillover e¤ects.
We use ( ) to capture the size of the spillovers. The larger ( ) ; i.e. the smaller
; the larger are the spillover e¤ects.
Proposition 3 The equilibrium number of domestic banks that invest in perfect
screening is a decreasing and concave function of the size of the spillover e¤ect.
That is,
dk
d ( ) < 0 and
d2k
d ( )2 < 0.
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Proof: see Appendix.
The intuition behind this result is as follows: with rising spillover e¤ects even
those domestic banks that do not invest in perfect screening are able to identify a
larger fraction of borrowers with bad projects. This, in turn, allows the banks to
become more competitive in the sense that they can decrease the repayment they
ask from the borrowers because the negative e¤ect of an increasing market share,
i.e. losses from bad projects, is reduced.
Consequently, banks investing in the perfect screening technology also need to
lower their repayment o¤ers and, in addition, their expected market share will fall.
Thus, domestic banks that do not invest in the perfect screening technology ob-
tain larger prots whereas prots of banks with perfect screening ability decrease.
Hence, the incentives to invest in the perfect screening technology and, accord-
ingly, the number of domestic banks investing in screening falls when spillovers
rise.
Note, however, that spillover e¤ects have a positive inuence on the overall
e¢ ciency of the domestic banking market in the sense that the domestic banks that
did not screen at all in the closed banking market obtain access to an imperfect
screening technology. Consequently, we identify a clear trade-o¤: with low spillover
e¤ects a large number of perfectly screening domestic banks operates in the market
but there are also a few banks that screen very imperfectly. The situation is
di¤erent with high spillovers: the number of domestic banks screening perfectly is
rather low but all other domestic banks not investing in screening operate quite
e¢ ciently due to the large spillovers.
Furthermore, as stated in the following Lemma, we nd that with rising spillovers
the range of xed costs F for which an equilibrium with all domestic banks invest-
ing in screening is feasible shrinks and the range of F for which no domestic bank
invests in screening enlarges. Hence, increasing spillovers decrease the number of
domestic banks investing in the screening technology as well as the chances that
an equilibrium establishes in which all domestic banks invest in screening.
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Lemma 1 With increasing spillover e¤ects the threshold values F and F deter-
mining the three possible equilibrium outcomes decline, that is
dF
d ( ) < 0 and
dF
d ( ) < 0.
Proof: see Appendix.
Next, we analyze the impact of competition in terms of the number of banks
operating in the market on the equilibrium number of domestic banks n that invest
in screening. Thereby, we capture the impact of the di¤erent entry modes on the
investment incentives of domestic banks. Note that when banks enter via a de novo
investment a foreign subsidiary is established in the domestic banking market and
so the number of banks operating in the market increases. In contrast, entry via
acquisition leaves the number of banks operating in the economy constant since
only the ownership of a domestic bank that is acquired by a foreign bank changes.
Proposition 4 characterizes how competition as measured by the number of banks
a¤ects k.
Proposition 4 The number of domestic banks that invest in perfect screening is
a decreasing and concave function of the overall number of banks in the market.
That is,
dk
dn
< 0 and
d2k
dn2
< 0.
Proof: see Appendix.
The intuition here is as follows: an increasing number of banks leads to lower
equilibrium repayment rates as well as to lower market shares for all banks. How-
ever, domestic banks not investing in screening lose relatively less since a falling
market share also means a smaller number of bad borrowers nanced.
Proposition 4 further implies that entry via a greeneld investment will decrease
the equilibrium number of domestic banks investing in screening by more than
entry via acquisition.
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In addition, we nd that mounting competition and, accordingly, greeneld
entry not only decreases the incentives of domestic banks to invest in screening
but also the chances that an equilibrium emerges in which all domestic banks
invest. Instead, the parameter range for which no domestic bank invests in the
screening technology widens. These ndings are summarized in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2 An increasing number of banks operating in the market leads to a fall
both in F and F , that is
dF
dn
< 0 and
dF
dn
< 0.
Proof: see Appendix.
Furthermore, our ndings indicate that de novo entry results in lower shares
of perfectly screening banks in the market than acquisition entry as is stated in
Lemma 3.
Lemma 3 The entry of a marginal foreign bank via the acquisition of a domestic
bank keeps the share of perfectly screening banks in the market constant. In con-
trast, the entry of a marginal foreign bank via a de novo investment reduces the
share of perfectly screening banks in the market.
Proof: see Appendix.
Hence, when we refer to the e¢ ciency of a banking market as the share of all
banks in the market that screen perfectly, we nd that acquisition entry entails
higher e¢ ciency than greeneld entry.
We now turn to the interaction of spillovers and competition in the number of
banks operating in the market. Our results are summarized in Proposition 5.
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Proposition 5 Spillovers and competition in the number of banks operating in
the market reinforce each other in their negative impact on the number of domes-
tic banks investing in screening, k. That is,
@2k
@ ( ) @n < 0.
Proof: see Appendix.
We nd that the larger the spillovers the higher is the absolute marginal neg-
ative impact of an increasing number of banks operating in the market on the in-
centives of domestic banks to invest in screening and vice versa. Hence, spillovers
and competition reinforce each other in their negative impact on the number of
perfectly screening domestic banks. We conclude that spillovers and competition
work as complements with respect to the investment incentives of domestic banks.
The intuition for this result is as follows. Higher spillovers entail larger market
shares of domestic banks not investing in screening. Thus, higher spillovers imply
that an increase in the number of banks operating in the market results in a loss
of relatively more borrowers with bad projects. Hence, the negative impact of
an increasing number of banks on the investment incentives of domestic banks is
reinforced with larger spillovers.
It is interesting to see that contrary to the often claimed positive role of
spillovers and competition for nancial development we arrive at the opposite
result.9 Even more, in our model one e¤ect cannot substitute for the other one,
rather, both e¤ects reinforce each other in their negative impact on the incentives
of domestic banks to invest in screening.
Note also that the higher the spillovers, the more distinct the implications of
de novo and acquisition entry. This is due to the fact that with larger spillovers
9In our model, higher spillovers and more competition through bank entry make domestic
banks invest less in the perfect screening technology. We abstract from potential exit of do-
mestic banks. Since we model the early liberalization period of a banking market and focus on
transition countries, we justify this approach by assuming an implicit bailout guarantee for the
predominating state domestic banks in the early years of transition.
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the negative impact of de novo investments on the equilibrium number of domestic
banks investing in screening becomes stronger.
For our policy conclusions it is important to know how the strength of the
spillover and competition e¤ects just described depends on the competitive envi-
ronment in the domestic banking market. In our model we capture this by the
degree of product di¤erentiation 1
t
. Before we address this issue in more detail,
we rst give an intuition of how competitive pressure 1
t
a¤ects the incentives of
domestic banks to invest in screening. Our results are summarized in Proposition
6.
Proposition 6 In case of l < n 2
2
, there exists a xed cost F1, such that the num-
ber of domestic banks that invest in perfect screening is a decreasing and convex
function of competitive pressure 1
t
for low values of the xed cost F , i.e. F < F1,
and an increasing and concave function of competitive pressure 1
t
for high values
of F , i.e. F > F1. In case of l > n 22 , the number of domestic banks that invest
in perfect screening is a decreasing and convex function of competitive pressure 1
t
independent of the size of the xed cost F . That is,
(1) if l < n 2
2
:
for F < F1, dk

d( 1t )
< 0 and d
2k
d( 1t )
2 > 0 and
for F > F1, dk

d( 1t )
> 0 and d
2k
d( 1t )
2 < 0;
(2) if l > n 2
2
: dk

d( 1t )
< 0 and d
2k
d( 1t )
2 > 0.
Proof: see Appendix.
Here, we identify two countervailing e¤ects, a price e¤ect and a market share
e¤ect. On the one hand, with higher competitive pressure all banks need to lower
the repayments they charge the borrowers. As a consequence, prots of all banks
fall. However, the prot of banks that invest in screening decrease by more than
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that of banks not investing in screening since the former cover a larger expected
market share. Thus, this negative price e¤ect works against investment incentives
of domestic banks. On the other hand, increasing competitive pressure implies
higher market shares of perfectly screening and lower market shares of imperfectly
screening banks. The resulting higher asymmetry of banks with respect to their
market shares leads to an increase in the prots of banks investing in screening
and a decrease in the prots of banks not investing. Hence, the driving factor
implying higher screening incentives when competitive pressure rises is the higher
asymmetry of banks in market shares.
The overall outcome depends on whether the market share e¤ect outweighs the
price e¤ect or vice versa. The rising asymmetry in market shares is the dominating
e¤ect when the number of perfectly screening banks in the market is rather small.
For this to be true it must hold that the share of foreign banks in the market is
not too large, i.e. l < n 2
2
, and that the xed cost for the screening technology
takes on rather high values, i.e. F > F1, ensuring rather low incentives to invest
in better screening. Then, with increasing competitive pressure the di¤erence in
the market shares of investing and not investing banks widens and, thus, a bank
can gain a lot when investing in the screening technology. For F < F1, instead,
the negative price e¤ect dominates the positive market share e¤ect. In this case,
a rise in competitive pressure has a negative impact on the number of domestic
banks investing in screening. Note that when foreign banks dominate roughly
more than one half of the banking market, i.e. l > n 2
2
, the negative price e¤ect
always outweighs the positive market share e¤ect, independent of the size of the
xed cost F . In that case, increasing competitive pressure always has a negative
impact on investment incentives.
It is interesting to observe that a rising number of banks operating in the market
and higher competitive pressure 1
t
can have the opposite e¤ect on the incentives of
domestic banks to invest in screening. This is due to the fact that both channels
of competition in our model work in quite di¤erent ways. In the rst case, the
decisive e¤ect leading to a fall in screening incentives is the smaller fraction of bad
borrowers nanced by imperfectly screening banks while in the second case, the
higher investment incentives are driven by a larger asymmetry of banks in market
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shares.
We now turn to the impact of the competitiveness of a market 1
t
on the strength
of the spillover and competition e¤ects. Our ndings are summarized in Proposi-
tion 7.
Proposition 7 Increasing competitive pressure 1
t
decreases the absolute marginal
negative inuence of spillovers and competition in the number of banks on the
incentives of domestic banks to invest in perfect screening. That is,
@2k
@ ( ) @  1
t
 > 0.
@2k
@n@
 
1
t
 > 0:
Proof: see Appendix.
Hence, increasing competitive pressure 1
t
mitigates the negative impact of
spillovers and competition in the number of banks on the incentives of domestic
banks to invest in screening. Accordingly, the lower the di¤erentiation of nancial
products in a market, the less pronounced is the e¤ect of the di¤erent entry modes
on the investment incentives of domestic banks.
The intuition for this result is as follows. Higher competitive pressure 1
t
corre-
sponds to smaller market shares of imperfectly screening domestic banks. Thus,
larger competitive pressure 1
t
implies that an increase in spillovers or the number
of banks in the market results in a smaller loss of borrowers with bad projects.
Hence, the negative impact of rising spillovers and competition in the number of
banks on the incentives to invest in screening is dampened with rising competitive
pressure.
We conclude that both channels of competition work as substitutes with respect
to the incentives to invest in screening. However, the interaction of spillovers and
competition is ambiguous. Spillovers and competition in terms of the degree of
product di¤erentiation constitute substitutes whereas spillovers and the number of
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banks in the market behave as complements regarding the investment incentives
of domestic banks.
5 Impact of Spillovers and Competition on Wel-
fare
In this section, we analyze the e¤ects of spillovers and competition on welfare, W .
Welfare consists of the sum of borrower rents and bank rents. Borrower rents are
captured by the willingness to pay of borrowers minus the repayments of borrowers
to banks and their transport costs. Bank rents include the revenues of banks minus
their costs. We could consider two possible welfare functions. The rst possibility
is to include the prots of foreign banks in the welfare function. This approach
could be justied by assuming that in case of acquisition entry, the price paid
to acquire a domestic bank equals all future expected prots of the foreign bank
merged with the domestic bank. In case of greeneld entry, a foreign bank may
be forced to buy a license equal to all future expected prots of the bank in order
to be allowed to enter the market. Alternatively, we could exclude the prots of
foreign banks from welfare in the domestic economy. However, since the results of
both set-ups turn out to be fairly similar we will restrict our presentation to the
rst approach.10
In what follows, we study the impact of spillovers as well as the number of
banks in the market and, thus, the entry mode on welfare. Our analysis will show
that the inuence of both e¤ects on welfare is ambiguous and depends on the
degree of product di¤erentiation prevailing in a market. Therefore, we will rst
give an intuition for the implications of the degree of product di¤erentiation on
welfare. Our ndings are summarized in Proposition 8.
10In order to analytically solve for the welfare implications, we focus on the following parameter
ranges throughout section 5. We assume that the share of borrowers with good projects is larger
than one half and not arbitrarily close to its boundary values, and that spillovers are not too
large i.e. 1   < 0:75.
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Proposition 8 Declining di¤erentiation in nancial products unambiguously in-
creases welfare. That is,
@W
@
 
1
t
 > 0.
Proof: see Appendix.
As can be inferred from Proposition 8, falling di¤erentiation in nancial prod-
ucts and thus rising competitiveness unambiguously increases welfare. This is
mainly due to the fact that borrowers have less pronounced preferences for a
certain type of bank and, accordingly, lower transportation costs. In addition,
mounting competitive pressure leads to larger market shares of perfectly and to
smaller market shares of imperfectly screening banks entailing less nancing of bad
borrowers.
Note that according to our previous analysis the strength of the spillover and
competition e¤ects decreases with falling product di¤erentiation. Hence, surpris-
ingly, welfare is maximized when the marginal impact of spillovers and competition
in the number of banks is small. We conclude that in a highly competitive market
with low product di¤erentiation, the often mentioned importance of spillovers and
competition for nancial development may be overestimated.
We will now study the inuence of the size of spillovers and competition in
terms of the number of banks on welfare. Both e¤ects depend on the degree of
competitiveness 1
t
prevailing in the market as well as the size of the xed cost F .
Our results are summarized in Proposition 9.
Proposition 9 There exists a threshold F2 for xed costs and three thresholds T1,
T2 and T3, T1 < T2 < T3, for the level of competitive pressure 1t with the following
properties:
(1) suppose F < F2,
then @W
@( ) < 0 if
1
t
< T1 or
1
t
> T2
and @W
@( ) > 0 if T1 <
1
t
< T2;
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(2) suppose F > F2,
then @W
@( ) > 0 if
1
t
< T3
and @W
@( ) < 0 if
1
t
> T3.
Proof: see Appendix.
We nd that for relatively small values of the xed cost F , welfare decreases
in spillovers for rather small and rather large values of competitiveness 1
t
, whereas
welfare increases in spillovers for intermediate values of 1
t
. For relatively high
values of the xed cost, welfare increases in spillovers for rather small values of 1
t
while it decreases for rather large values of 1
t
.
Intuitively, these results can be explained as follows. Consider a situation
of rather low competitive pressure 1
t
. In case of low xed costs, incentives of
domestic banks to invest in screening are high and rise further when spillovers fall.
In contrast, for rather large values of the xed costs, a small number of domestic
banks invests in screening and rising spillovers lower the investment incentives even
more. As a result, in both cases, the composition of the banking market becomes
more homogeneous in the sense that either perfectly or imperfectly screening banks
dominate the market. It follows that transport costs paid in the economy fall and,
in turn, welfare increases.
However, with falling di¤erentiation in nancial products, investment incen-
tives of domestic banks cease to vary a lot with the level of spillovers. For su¢ -
ciently large competitive pressure 1
t
, it is welfare optimal to limit spillover e¤ects,
independent of the size of the xed cost. Then, the market shares of domestic
banks not investing in screening fall whereas the market shares of perfectly screen-
ing banks rise entailing a decrease in the number of bad borrowers nanced and,
in turn, an increase in welfare.
Form Proposition 9 it can be inferred that, in general, it is welfare optimal to
foster spillover e¤ects when competitive pressure in terms of product di¤erentiation
is rather low and to limit spillovers in the presence of relatively large competitive
pressure. Hence, spillovers and competitive pressure 1
t
tend to work as a form of
substitutes with respect to welfare. This corresponds to our previous ndings of
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spillovers and competitive pressure 1
t
behaving as substitutes with respect to the
incentives of domestic banks to invest in screening.
Now, we turn to the impact of competition in terms of the number of banks
operating in the market and, thus, the entry mode of foreign banks on welfare.
Foreign banks should enter via a de novo investment if an increase in the number
of banks operating in the market raises welfare. We nd that this is the case for
low xed costs in combination with high competitive pressure 1
t
as well as for high
xed costs combined with either very low or very high competitive pressure 1
t
, as
is stated in Proposition 10.
Proposition 10 There exists a threshold F3 for xed costs and three thresholds
T4, T5 and T6, T4 < T5 < T6, for the level of competitive pressure 1t with the
following properties:
(1) suppose F < F3,
then @W
@n
< 0 if 1
t
< T6
and @W
@n
> 0 if 1
t
> T6;
(2) suppose F > F3,
then @W
@n
> 0 if 1
t
< T4 or
1
t
> T5
and @W
@n
< 0 if T4 <
1
t
< T5.
Proof: see Appendix.
The intuition for these results corresponds to the previous reasoning regarding
spillover e¤ects. Consider a situation of rather low competitive pressure 1
t
. In case
of low xed costs incentives of domestic banks to invest in screening are high and
rise further when the number of banks operating in the market falls. In contrast,
for large xed costs, a small number of domestic banks invests in screening and a
rising number of banks in the market lowers the investment incentives even more.
Again, the composition of the banking market becomes more homogeneous, leading
to a fall in the transport costs paid in the economy and, in turn, an increase in
welfare.
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Yet, with falling product di¤erentiation, investment incentives of domestic
banks cease to vary a lot with the number of banks operating in the market.
Then, for su¢ ciently high competitive pressure 1
t
, an increase in the number of
banks operating in the market is welfare improving, independent of the size of the
xed costs. Due to the fall in the market shares of all banks less borrowers with
bad projects obtain nancing and welfare rises.
Hence, a decreasing number of banks in the market is in general considered
welfare optimal for relatively low competitive pressure 1
t
. In contrast, in the pres-
ence of rather high competitive pressure an increase in the number of banks is to
be preferred. It follows that both channels of competition in our model tend to
work as a form of complements with respect to welfare.
As a consequence, the entry of foreign banks via a de novo investment generally
benets the economy as a whole when the di¤erentiation in nancial products
in the banking market is rather low. Otherwise, entry of foreign banks via the
acquisition of a domestic bank is to be preferred from a welfare perspective.
We now turn to the comparison of spillovers and competition in the number of
banks in their impact on welfare. In a situation of relatively small xed costs, it
is welfare optimal to increase spillovers but to decrease the number of banks oper-
ating in the market when competitive pressure 1
t
is small. In contrast, with high
competitive pressure, it is optimal to decrease spillovers but to increase the num-
ber of banks in the market. Similarly, in a situation of relatively large xed costs,
spillovers and competition in the number of banks operating in the market work
in the opposite direction as well. As it was the case for spillovers and competition
in terms of product di¤erentiation, we conclude that spillovers and competition in
terms of the number of banks tend to work as substitutes with respect to welfare.
Moreover, it is interesting to see that both rising spillovers and competition
in the number of banks operating in the market have a clear-cut negative e¤ect
on the incentives of domestic banks to invest in screening whereas their impact on
welfare is ambiguous. In contrast, although the inuence of competitive pressure
in terms of lower product di¤erentiation on the incentives of domestic banks to
invest in screening is ambiguous, its e¤ect on welfare is clearly positive.
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Our main results from the welfare analysis can be summarized as follows. In-
creasing competitive pressure 1
t
clearly raises welfare. The e¤ects of spillovers and
the number of banks in the market and, thus, the entry mode of foreign banks on
welfare are ambiguous. Both e¤ects depend on the degree of product di¤erentia-
tion in the market. When competitive pressure 1
t
is rather low, welfare tends to
increase when spillovers rise and the number of banks decreases. In contrast, with
relatively high competitive pressure, lower spillovers as well as a rising number
of banks and, accordingly, greeneld entry tends to be preferred from a welfare
perspective.
It follows that both modes of competition work as a form of complements
when looking at welfare. In particular, a larger number of banks operating in the
market and thus greeneld entry can, in general, only be welfare increasing when
competitive pressure in terms of lower product di¤erentiation is also su¢ ciently
large. In that case, one sole channel of competition cannot be welfare enhancing,
rather, a high level of both modes of competitive pressure is necessary for raising
welfare. Second, we conclude that spillovers constitute a form of substitute relative
to either mode of competition, i.e. potential positive welfare e¤ects of spillovers
are lower the stronger is competition.
6 Conclusions
We have set up a model of spatial bank competition to analyze the impact of
foreign bank entry on a liberalizing banking market. In particular, we studied how
the interaction of spillovers and competition a¤ect both the incentives of domestic
banks to invest in screening and welfare.
We found that spillovers and competition in the number of banks reinforce
each other in their negative impact on the incentives of domestic banks to invest
in screening but that the strength of both e¤ects is mitigated with lower product
di¤erentiation. With respect to welfare, however, spillovers and either channel
of competition tend to work as substitutes whereas both modes of competitive
pressure rather behave as complements.
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We conclude our analysis with some policy conclusions based on the results from
our welfare analysis. In a rst step, we could interpret di¤erent values of the xed
cost spent in order to obtain the perfect screening technology as corresponding
to di¤erent stages of development in countries liberalizing their banking markets.
Less developed countries would thus be characterized by larger costs for investing in
screening than more developed countries. This could be due to higher costs related
to the development of human capital, necessary restructuring processes or the
upgrading of technical facilities. Then, when the level of di¤erentiation in nancial
products is high, for very low developed countries it would be considered welfare
optimal to let foreign banks enter their markets via greeneld investments whereas
more developed countries should open up for foreign banks via the acquisition of
domestic banks. Furthermore, very low developed countries should try to foster
spillovers whereas more developed countries should seek to limit spillover e¤ects.
However, in countries with a low degree of product di¤erentiation the preferred
entry mode as well as the optimal level of spillovers would be independent of the
development status of countries. As demonstrated above, a greeneld investment
of a foreign bank is then considered the favorite entry mode and spillovers should
be dampened.
We could as well apply our model to a dynamic liberalization process by as-
suming that shortly after the opening up of a banking market the xed costs spent
to attain better screening skills are larger than during later periods of the liberal-
ization process. In addition, we could think of di¤erentiation in nancial products
to be falling over time. On the one hand, this could be the result of an increasing
transparency of the banking market or a mounting standardization of nancial
products which could make preferences of borrowers for a certain type of bank
less pronounced. On the other hand, by the introduction of new technologies like
internet banking etc., physical transportation costs of borrowers may fall alike.
Hence, we could state that a country that liberalizes its banking market moves
from a situation of high xed costs and high product di¤erentiation to an envi-
ronment of low xed costs and low product di¤erentiation. A policy maker should
then try to foster spillovers and to restrict the entry mode of foreign banks to de
novo investments in the early stages of liberalization. After allowing for acquisition
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entry in an environment of intermediate competitive pressure, in later periods of
the liberalization process the policy maker should try to limit spillovers and move
to greeneld entry again. Hence, the often mentioned positive role of spillovers
for nancial development may be overestimated. With an increasing development
of nancial markets, spillovers may even harm a country and lead to a decline in
welfare.
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8 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
The condition for the marginal borrower is given by
xz =
rz r
2t
+ 1
2n
with z = L;H.
It follows that the expected market share of a bank can be expressed by
2m[(1  q)xH + qxL] = m[ (1 q)rH r+qrLt + 1n ].
Hence, the prot of a domestic bank investing in screening DB;L, the prot of a
domestic bank not investing in screening DB;H , and the prot of a foreign bank
FB are given by:
DB;L = (r   i) m[ (1 q)rH r+qrLt + 1n ]  F
DB;H = (r   i) m[ (1 q)rH r+qrLt + 1n ]  i (1  )m[ (1 q)rH r+qrLt + 1n ]
FB = (r   i) m[ (1 q)rH r+qrLt + 1n ].
Banks maximize their prots with respect to the repayment they ask from borrow-
ers which gives rL = i+ tn +
i(1 )

1 q
2
and rH = i+ tn +
i(1 )

 
1  q
2

. Clearly,
it holds that rL < rH .
Proof of Proposition 2:
(1) equilibrium in which all domestic banks invest in perfect screening
It must hold that k = n   l. Since there must not be any incentives to deviate
from the equilibrium it must be satised that:
DB;L (k = n  l)  DB;H (k = n  l   1) which is equivalent to
m
t
[1
2
n l (n l)
n 1
i(1 )

+ t
n
]2   F  m
t
[ 1
2
l+(n l 1) 1
n 1
i(1 )

+ t
n
]2 or
F  n 2
n 1 [
mi(1 )
n
  m(i(1 ))2
4t
n 2
n 1 ] := F .
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(2) equilibrium in which no domestic bank invests in perfect screening
It must hold that k = 1.11 Since there must not be any incentives to deviate from
the equilibrium, it must be satised that:
DB;H (k = 1)  DB;L (k = 2) which is equivalent to
m
t
[ 1
2
l+1 1
n 1
i(1 )

+ t
n
]2  m
t
f1
2
[1  l+2 1
n 1 ]
i(1 )

+ t
n
g2   F or
F  n 2
n 1 [
mi(1 )
n
+ m(i(1 ))
2
4t
n 2l 2
n 1 ] := F .
(3) equilibrium in which the domestic banks coordinate about a certain number of
banks investing in perfect screening
In an equilibrium in which the domestic banks coordinate about a certain num-
ber k of banks investing in the perfect screening technology it must hold that
given that k domestic banks invest in screening all domestic banks are indi¤er-
ent between investing or not investing in the screening technology. However, for
DB;H

k = ek = DB;L k = ek there are incentives to deviate from ek as it
holds that dH
dk
=  mi(1 )
t(n 1) [
t
n
  1
2
l+k 1
n 1
i(1 )

] which is negative since the term
in brackets corresponds to the market share of a domestic bank not investing in
screening which must be positive. Hence, DB;H

k = ek   1 > DB;L k = ek
holds and the condition guaranteeing that there are no incentives to deviate from
the equilibrium in which the domestic banks coordinate about a certain number
k of banks investing in perfect screening is given by:
DB;L (k = k
)  DB;H (k = k   1) ^ DB;H (k = k)  DB;L (k = k + 1).
This is equivalent to
m
t
f1
2
[1  l+k 1
n 1 ]
i(1 )

+ t
n
g2   F  m
t
[ 1
2
l+(k 1) 1
n 1
i(1 )

+ t
n
]2 ^
m
t
[ 1
2
l+k 1
n 1
i(1 )

+ t
n
]2  m
t
f1
2
[1  l+(k+1) 1
n 1 ]
i(1 )

+ t
n
g2   F
11since q is dened as q = l+k 1n 1 ; k
 is dened to be equal to 1 in case no domestic bank
invests in screening. The probability that the neighboring bank is a perfectly screening bank is
then equal to ln 1 :
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It follows that k must lie in the range
n
2
  l   2t(n 1)
i(1 ) [
F
mi(1 )
(n 1)
(n 2)   1n ]  k  n2   l + 1  2t(n 1)i(1 ) [ Fmi(1 ) (n 1)(n 2)   1n ].
We dene k =: n
2
  l   2t(n 1)
i(1 ) [
F
mi(1 )
(n 1)
(n 2)   1n ] + x with x 2 [0; 1].
Further, it must hold that
1 < n
2
 l  2t(n 1)
i(1 ) [
F
mi(1 )
(n 1)
(n 2)  1n ] and n2 l+1  2t(n 1)i(1 ) [ Fmi(1 ) (n 1)(n 2)  1n ] < n l
which simplies to
F < n 2
n 1 [
mi(1 )
n
+ m(i(1 ))
2
4t
n 2l 2
n 1 ] and F >
n 2
n 1 [
mi(1 )
n
  m(i(1 ))2
4t
n 2
n 1 ].
Hence, an equilibrium in which the domestic banks coordinate about a certain
number k of banks investing in perfect screening exists for F < F < F .
Proof of Proposition 3:
dk
d( ) =
2t(n 1)
2i(1 ) [
1
n
  2F
mi(1 )
n 1
n 2 ] and
dk
d( ) < 0 if F >
1
2
mi(1 )
n
n 2
n 1 .
Note that from the condition that the marginal borrower must be located in be-
tween two neighboring banks it follows that (1 )i
2t
 1
n
. Note also that with
(1 )i
2t
= 1
n
the lowest possible value of F is reached and equals 1
2
mi(1 )
(n 1)
n 2
n 1 := F .
Since 1
2
mi(1 )
n
n 2
n 1 < F it holds that
dk
d( ) < 0.
d2k
d( )2 =
4t(n 1)
(1 )i3 [
1
n
  3F
mi(1 )
n 1
n 2 ] and
d2k
d( )2 < 0 if F >
1
3
mi(1 )
n
n 2
n 1 .
Since 1
3
mi(1 )
n
n 2
n 1 < F it holds that
d2k
d( )2 < 0.
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Proof of Lemma 1:
dF
d( ) =  i (1  )mn 2n 1 [ 1n   i(1 )2t n 2n 1 ] and
dF
d( ) < 0 if
i(1 )
2t
< n 1
n(n 2) .
Since i(1 )
2t
 1
n
holds, dF
d( ) < 0 is satised.
dF
d( ) =  i (1  )mn 2n 1 [ 1n + i(1 )2t n 2l 2n 1 ] and
dF
d( ) < 0 if
1
n
>  i(1 )
2t
n 2l 2
n 1 which is satised since
(i) for n  2l   2 > 0, 1
n
>  i(1 )
2t
n 2l 2
n 1 obviously is fullled and
(ii) for n  2l  2 < 0, 1
n
>  i(1 )
2t
n 2l 2
n 1 is equivalent to
i(1 )
2t
< 1
n
n 1
2l n+2 . Due
to i(1 )
2t
 1
n
, the condition holds if l < n 1:5, which is fullled as per denition,
k > 1.
Proof of Proposition 4:
dk
dn
= 1
2
  2t
i(1 ) [
F (n 1)(n 3)
mi(1 )(n 2)2   1n2 ].
Consider rst bF = mi(1 )
n
n 2
n 1  m[i(1 )]
2
4t
(n 6)(n 2)
(n 1)2 for which k
 = n  l 2 holds.
In that case, we arrive at
dk
dn
= 1
2
  2t
i(1 )f (n 1)(n 3)mi(1 )(n 2)2 [
mi(1 )
n
n 2
n 1   m(i(1 ))
2
4t
(n 6)(n 2)
(n 1)2 ]  1n2g.
If follows that dk

dn
< 0 if i(1 )
2t
< 1
n
(n 1)(n2 4n+2)
n(n2 6n+10) .
Since i(1 )
2t
 1
n
and
(n 1)(n2 4n+2)
n(n2 6n+10) > 1, it follows that
dk
dn
< 0. Since @
2k
@n@F
=  
2t(n 1)(n 3)
m[i(1 )]2(n 2)2 < 0,
dk
dn
< 0 also holds for F > bF .
Consider second eF = mi(1 )
n
n 2
n 1   m[i(1 )]
2
4t
(n 4)(n 2)
(n 1)2 for which k
 = n   l   1
holds. In that case, we arrive at
dk
dn
= 1
2
  2t
i(1 )f (n 1)(n 3)mi(1 )(n 2)2 [
mi(1 )
n
n 2
n 1   m(i(1 ))
2
4t
(n 4)(n 2)
(n 1)2 ]  1n2g.
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If follows that dk

dn
< 0 if i(1 )
2t
< 1
n
(n 1)(n2 4n+2)
n(n2 5n+7) .
Since i(1 )
2t
 1
n
but
(n 1)(n2 4n+2)
n(n2 5n+7) < 1 is possible,
dk
dn
> 0 is feasible for
F = eF . However, k n+ 1; eF < k n; eF if i(1 )
2t
< 1
n+1
2n(n 1)(n 3)
2n3 10n2+16n 5 . Since
i(1 )
2t
 1
n+1
must hold and 2n(n 1)(n 3)
16n 10n2+2n3 5 > 1, k


n+ 1; eF < k n; eF holds.
Thus, with a rising number of banks, the number of domestic banks investing in
perfect screening falls.
d2k
dn2
=   2t
i(1 ) [
2
n3
+ 2F
mi(1 )(n 2)3 ] is clearly negative.
Proof of Lemma 2:
dF
dn
=  mi(1 )
(n 1)2 [
n2 4n+2
n2
+ i(1 )
2t
n 2
n 1 ] and
dF
dn
< 0 if i(1 )
2t
>   1
n
n2 4n+2
n
n 1
n 2 which is satised.
dF
dn
=  mi(1 )
(n 1)2 [
n2 4n+2
n2
  i(1 )
2t
n+l(n 3) 2
n 1 ] and
dF
dn
< 0 if l
n
<
(n 2)(n 4)  2
n
(n 3)n
Note that lim
n !1
(n 2)(n 4)  2
n
(n 3)n = 1. Hence,
dF
dn
< 0 holds for not too large shares of
foreign banks in the market.
Proof of Lemma 3:
Share of all perfectly screening banks in the market in case of acquisition
entry:
We start from an equilibrium in which the share of all perfectly screening banks
is given by k
+l
n
. By opening the market for a marginal foreign bank to enter via
acquisition we arrive at k
+dkA+l+dl
n
. Since dkA =  dl it holds that k
+dkA+l+dl
n
=
k+l
n
.
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Share of all perfectly screening banks in the market in case of greeneld
entry:
We start from an equilibrium in which the share of all perfectly screening banks
is given by k
+l
n
. By opening the market for a marginal foreign bank to enter
via a de novo investment we arrive at k
+dkG+l+dl
n+dn
. Since dkG =  dl + f12  
2t
i(1 ) [
F (n 1)(n 3)
mi(1 )(n 2)2   1n2 ]gdn, the share of perfectly screening banks in the market
becomes
k+l+f 1
2
  2t
i(1 ) [
F (n 1)(n 3)
mi(1 )(n 2)2 
1
n2
]gdn
n+dn
. Provided that a marginal foreign bank
enters, we can set dn = 1. Note further, that 1
2
  2t
i(1 ) [
F (n 1)(n 3)
mi(1 )(n 2)2   1n2 ] < 1 if
F > (n 2)
2
(n 1)(n 3) [
mi(1 )
n2
  m(i(1 ))2
4t
]. Since (n 2)
2
(n 1)(n 3) [
mi(1 )
n2
  m(i(1 ))2
4t
] < F ,
it holds that
k+l+f 1
2
  2t
i(1 ) [
F (n 1)(n 3)
mi(1 )(n 2)2 
1
n2
]gdn
n+dn
< k
+l
n
.
Proof of Proposition 5:
@2k
@( )@n =
2t
n22i(1 )   4tFm3i2(1 )2
(n 1)(n 3)
(n 2)2 and
@2k
@( )@n < 0 if F >
1
2
mi(1 )
(n 1)
(n 2)2
n2(n 3) .
Since 1
2
mi(1 )
(n 1)
(n 2)2
n2(n 3) < F it holds that
@2k
@( )@n < 0.
Proof of Proposition 6:
dk
d( 1t )
= 2t
2(n 1)
i(1 ) [
F
mi(1 )
n 1
n 2   1n ] and
dk
d( 1t )
> 0 if F > mi(1 )
n
n 2
n 1 and
dk
d( 1t )
< 0 if F < mi(1 )
n
n 2
n 1 .
We dene F1 :=
mi(1 )
n
n 2
n 1 .
d2k
d( 1t )
2 =
4t3(n 1)
i(1 ) [
1
n
  F
mi(1 )
n 1
n 2 ] and
d2k
d( 1t )
2 > 0 if F < F1 and d
2k
d( 1t )
2 < 0 if F > F1.
Note that F > F1 is only possible if F1 < F which holds for l < n 22 .
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Proof of Proposition 7:
@2k
@( )@( 1t )
= 2t
2(n 1)
2i(1 ) [
2F (n 1)
mi(1 )(n 2)   1n ] and
@2k
@( )@( 1t )
> 0 if F > 1
2
mi(1 )
n
n 2
n 1 .
Since 1
2
mi(1 )
n
n 2
n 1 < F it holds that
@2k
@( )@( 1t )
> 0.
@2k
@n@( 1t )
= 2t
2
i(1 ) [
F (n 1)(n 3)
mi(1 )(n 2)2   1n2 ] and
@2k
@n@( 1t )
> 0 if F > mi(1 )
n2
(n 2)2
(n 1)(n 3) .
Since mi(1 )
n2
(n 2)2
(n 1)(n 3) < F it holds that
@2k
@n@( 1t )
> 0.
Proof of Proposition 8:
Set-up of the Social Welfare Function:
Welfare consists of the sum of borrower rents and bank rents. Borrower rents are
captured by the willingness to pay of borrowers minus the repayments of borrowers
to banks and their transport costs. Bank rents include the revenues of banks minus
their costs.12
Transport costs are given by
2m (k + l) [n l k

n 1
1
2n
+
i(1 )
4tZ
0
txdx+ l+k
 1
n 1
1
2nZ
0
txdx]+
2m (n  l   k) [n l k
n 1
1
2nZ
0
txdx+ l+k
 1
n 1
1
2n
 i(1 )
4tZ
0
txdx] =
tmfn k l
n 1
i(1 )
4t
[i(1 )
4t
(2k + 2l   1) + 1
n
] + 1
4n
g.
12In order to analytically solve for the welfare implications, we focus on the following parameter
ranges throughout section 5. We assume that the share of borrowers with good projects is larger
than one half and not arbitrarily close to its boundary values, and that spillovers are not too
large i.e. 1   < 0:75.
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Since the repayments of borrowers to banks equal the revenues of banks, welfare
can be expressed as
W = vm + 0 m (1  )  tmfn k l
n 1
i(1 )
4t
[i(1 )
4t
(2k + 2l   1) + 1
n
] + 1
4n
g 
kmi[n l k

n 1
i(1 )
2t
+ 1
n
]  kF   lmi[n l k
n 1
i(1 )
2t
+ 1
n
] 
(n  l   k) im[  l+k 1
n 1
i(1 )
2t
+ 1
n
][ + (1  )]
E¤ect of competitive pressure 1
t
on welfare:
@W
@( 1t )
= 1
32mn2[i(1 )]2(n 1)(n 2)2{[mi (1  ) (n  2)]2[ (1  ) i2n (n  2x)
( (1  ) (4   1) (n  1 + 2x)  4 ( (1  ) + 2))  8t22 (n  1)] F
[4t (n  1)]2[Fn (n  1) (n  4   1) mi (1  ) (n  2) (2n  4   1)]}.
@W
@( 1t )
> 0 holds if
 
1
t
2
> 8(n 1)[mi(1 )(n 2)]
2+F [4(n 1)]2[Fn(n 1)(n 4 1) mi(1 )(n 2)(2n 4 1)]
inm2[i(1 )]3(n 2)2(n 2x)[(1 )(4 1)(n 1+2x) 4((1 )+2)] .
13
@W
@( 1t )
> 0 is satised for
8(n 1)[mi(1 )(n 2)]2+F [4(n 1)]2[Fn(n 1)(n 4 1) mi(1 )(n 2)(2n 4 1)]
inm2[i(1 )]3(n 2)2(n 2x)[(1 )(4 1)(n 1+2x) 4((1 )+2)] < 0.
This inequality holds for
F2[1 
q
1  2n(n 4 1)
(2n 4 1)2 ] < F < F2[1 +
q
1  2n(n 4 1)
(2n 4 1)2 ]
with F2 := 12
mi(1 )
n
n 2
n 1
2n 4 1
n 4 1 .
(i) Proof of F > F2[1 
q
1  2n(n 4 1)
(2n 4 1)2 ]:
Since F2[1 
q
1  2n(n 4 1)
(2n 4 1)2 ] < F for n > 5 it holds that F > F2[1 
q
1  2n(n 4 1)
(2n 4 1)2 ].
13We assume that n is not too small and that  is not too close to its boundary values such
that  (1  ) (4   1) (n  1 + 2x)  4[ (1  ) + 2] > 0.
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(ii) Proof of F < F2[1 +
q
1  2n(n 4 1)
(2n 4 1)2 ]:
Note that with (1 )i
2t
= 1
n
the highest possible value of F is reached and equals
mi(1 )
n
n 2
n 1 [
3
2
  2l+1
2(n 1) ]. Further, F2[1+
q
1  2n(n 4 1)
(2n 4 1)2 ] >
3
2
mi(1 )
n
n 2
n 1 holds for
n > 5 such that F < F2[1 +
q
1  2n(n 4 1)
(2n 4 1)2 ] holds.
Proof of Proposition 9:
@W
@( ) =   1mn(n 1)[4i(1 )(n 2)]2{ m2 (n  2)2 [i (1  )]3[ int (n  2x)
[4 ( +  (1  ))   (1  ) (4   1) (n  1 + 2x)]+
2[4 (n  1)2 + (2x  1) ((n  1) (4   1)  n)]] 8Ft2 (n  1)2
[2Fn (n  1) (n  4   1) mi (1  ) (n  2)  2n  4   1 + 2in
t

]}.
@W
@( ) > 0 holds if
T1 <
1
t
< T2
with T1 := A
 
1 p1 B and T2 := A  1 +p1 B and
A := 8Fin
3(n 1)2 m[i(1 )]2(n 2)C1
m[i(1 )]2n(n 2)(n 2x)C2
B := 8Fi(1 )
2n(n 1)2(n 2x)[2Fn(n 1)(n 4 1) mi(1 )(n 2)(2n 4 1)]C2
[8Fi3n(n 1)2 m(i(1 ))2(n 2)C1]2
C1 := 4 (n  1)2 + (2x  1) [(n  1) (4   1)  n] > 0
C2 := i[4[ +  (1  )]   (1  ) (4   1) (n  1 + 2x)] < 0.
Note that A > 0 holds if F < mi(1 )
n
n 2
n 1
(1 )C1
82(n 1) .
Remember that F  3
2
mi(1 )
n
n 2
n 1 . Further,
(1 )C1
82(n 1) >
3
2
is satised for n > 13.
Hence, F < mi(1 )
n
n 2
n 1
(1 )C1
82(n 1) is fullled and A > 0 holds.
It follows from A > 0 that
(i) T2 > 0 and
(ii) T1 > 0 if B > 0 and T1 < 0 if B < 0.
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Note that B > 0 is equivalent to F < F2.
Further, it is easily veried that T2 jF>F2> T2 jF<F2 . We dene T3 := T2 jF>F2 .
It follows that
(i) for F < F2, @W@( ) < 0 if
1
t
< T1 or 1t > T2 and
@W
@( ) > 0 if T1 <
1
t
< T2;
(ii) for F > F2, @W@( ) > 0 if
1
t
< T3 and @W@( ) < 0 if
1
t
> T3.
Proof of Proposition 10:
@W
@n
=   1
32(i(1 ))2mn2t2(n 1)2(n 2)3{(mi (1  ))
2 (n  2)3[2i (1  )x[i (1  )n2
[(4   1) (1  2x)+4(1+ 2
(1 ))]+4t(n
2 (n  1)2 (4   1))]+4t[(n  1)2
(8i2 (1  ) + i (8   1) + 2t)+i (n2 (2   1)   (2n  1))]  (ni (1  ))2
[((4   1) (n  1)2+4)+ 82
(1 ) ]] 4t (n  1)2 F [4tFn2 (n  1) [(n  1) (n  4)
+8] mi (1  ) (n  2)[in2[ (1  )(4 (n  1) (n  2) 4 (n  4x)+1
 4x) 82]+4t[n2 (4   1)  2 (4 + 1) (n  1)]]]}
@W
@n
< 0 holds if
T4 <
1
t
< T5
with T4 := D
 
1 p1  E and T5 := D  1 +p1  E and
D :=  2i[mi(1 )(n 2)2G1+n2(n 1)2FG4]
m[i(1 )]3n2(n 2)2G2
E := 2(n 2)[(1 )n(n 1)]
2[(mi(1 ))2(n 2)3 2FG3]G2
[mi(1 )(n 2)2G1+n2(n 1)2FG4]2
G1 := 4 (n  1)2 [ (1  )+2]  (1  ) (1  2x) [2n (n  1)+1 4 (n  1)2]
G2 := [8   1 + 82(1 ) ] (2x  1)  (4   1) [n (n  2) + 4x2]
G3 := Fn
2 (n  1) [(n  1) (n  4) + 8] 
mi (1  ) (n  2) [n2 (4   1)  2 (4 + 1) (n  1)]
G4 :=  (1  ) [4 (n2   4n+ 2) + 1 + 4x (4   1)]  82
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It is useful to show for further proofs that (i) G1 > 0, (ii) G2 < 0 and (iii) G4 > 0.
(i) Proof of G1 > 0:
Note that for x = 1, G1 simplies to 82 (n  1)2+ (1  ) [2n (n  1)+1] which
clearly is positive. Note that dG1
dx
= 2 (1  ) [2n (n  1)+1  4 (n  1)2]. Since
2n (n  1) + 1  4 (n  1)2 < 014 it follows that G1 > 0 holds also for x < 1.
(ii) Proof of G2 < 0:
For x = 1, G2 equals 8   1 + 82(1 )   (4   1) [n (n  2) + 4] < 0.15 Further,
dG2
dx
> 0 for x < 8 1
4(4 1) +
22
(1 )(4 1) . Since
8 1
4(4 1) +
22
(1 )(4 1) > 1 it holds that
G2 < 0.
(iii) Proof of G4 > 0:
G4 > 0 holds if  >
82
(1 )[4(n2 4n+2)+1+4x(4 1)] . Further, for x = 0 the condition
simplies to  > 8
2
(1 )[4(n2 4n+2)+1] which holds.
15 Hence,
 > 8
2
(1 )[4(n2 4n+2)+1+4x(4 1)] is also satised for x > 0 and thus, G4 > 0 holds.
We now show that D > 0. D > 0 holds if G2 < 0 and mi (1  ) (n  2)2G1 +
n2 (n  1)2 FG4 > 0, with the rst condition already proved. The second condition
is equivalent to F >  mi(1 )
n2
(n 2)2
(n 1)2
G1
G4
. Since G1 > 0 and G4 > 0, this condition
clearly is satised and D > 0 holds.
It follows from D > 0 that
(i) T5 > 0 and
(ii) T4 > 0 if E > 0 and T4 < 0 if E < 0.
Note that E < 0 is equivalent to
F4 < F < F3
with F4 := H
 
1 p1 + J and F3 := H  1 +p1 + J and
14 for  not too close to 0:5 and n not too small
15 for  not too close to 1 and n not too small
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H := mi(1 )(n 2)[n
2(4 1) 2(4+1)(n 1)]
2n2(n 1)[(n 1)(n 4)+8]
J := 2(n 1)(n 2)n
2[(n 1)(n 4)+8]
[n2(4 1) 2(4+1)(n 1)]2 .
Note that since n2 (4   1)  2 (4 + 1) (n  1) > 0 it holds that H > 0 and J > 0
clearly holds.
It follows from J > 0 that F4 < 0. Hence, it holds that E < 0 and thus T4 < 0 for
F < F3 and E > 0 and thus T4 > 0 for F > F3.
Further, it is easily veried that T5 jF<F3> T5 jF>F3 . We dene T6 := T5 jF<F3 .
It follows that
(i) for F < F3, @W@n < 0 if
1
t
< T6 and @W@n > 0 if
1
t
> T6;
(ii) for F > F3, @W@n > 0 if
1
t
< T4 or 1t > T5 and
@W
@n
< 0 if T4 < 1t < T5.
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